This is a joint blog post, from Adiscon and Semmle, about the finding and fixing of CVE-2018-1000140, a security vulnerability in librelp. This was a collaborative effort by:
- Kevin Backhouse, Semmle, Security Researcher.
- Rainer Gerhards, Adiscon, Founder and President.
- Bas van Schaik, Semmle, Head of Product.
We have published this post on Rainer’s blog here and the LGTM blog.
Bas originally found the vulnerability (using lgtm.com) and Rainer fixed it. Kev developed the proof-of-concept exploit.
In this blog post, we explain the cause of the bug, which is related to a subtle gotcha in the behavior of snprintf, and how it was found by a default query on https://lgtm.com/. We also demonstrate a working exploit (in a docker container, so that you can safely download it and try it for yourself). As a bonus, we give a short tutorial on how to set up rsyslog with TLS for secure communication between the client and server. Continue reading “How we found and fixed a CVE in librelp”
We use static code analysis for two reasons. Both of them should probably be well-know, but discussions show that that’s not always the case. So I thought writing a small blog post makes sense.
The first reason is obvious: static analyzers help us catch code problems in early stages, and they do so without any special effort needed by test engineers. The analyzer “thinks” about many cases a human being does not think about and so can catch errors that are sometimes embarrassingly obvious – albeit you would have still overlooked them. Detecting these things early saves a lot of time. So we try to run the analyzers early and often (they are also part of our CI for that reason). Continue reading “Why we use Static Code Analysis”
The new has already spread: rsyslog 7.3 is the first version that natively supports log signatures, and does so via a newly introduced open signature provider interface. A lot of my followers quickly realized that and begun to play with it. To make sense of the provider interface, one obviously also needs a signature provider. I selected the keyless signature infrastructure (KSI), which is being engineered by the OpenKSI group. Quickly, I was asked what were the compelling reasons to provide the first signature provider for this technology.
So rather than writing many mails, I thought I blog about the reason ;) Continue reading “rsyslog’s first signature provider: why Guardtime?”
With the interest in privacy concerns currently having a “PRISM-induced high”, I wanted to elaborate a little bit about what rsyslog’s Guardtime signature provider actually transmits to the signature authority.
This is a condensed post of what the provider does, highlighting the main points. If you are really concerned, remember that everything is open source. So you are invited to read the actual signature provider source, all of which is available at the rsyslog git.
The most interesting question first: the provider does only send a top-level hash to the signature authority. No actual log record will ever be sent or otherwise disclosed. Continue reading “Which data does the Guardtime signature provider transfer to external parties?”