Atlantis’ launch moves to February 2008

Space Shuttle Atlantis is likely to launch not earlier than February. The target launch date of January, 10th 2007 for Atlantis STS-122 mission has been pushed back to early February. This is the result of today’s mission management meeting.

The official NASA shuttle home page is even a bit more cautious:

NASA space shuttle managers met Thursday and decided to modify a fuel sensor system to correct false readings that postponed shuttle Atlantis’ planned launches on Dec. 6 and Dec. 9.

Testing and analysis indicate that false readings from the engine cutoff sensor system occur in a three part feed-through connector. The connector passes electric signals from sensors inside the external fuel tank to shuttle electronics outside the tank. Technicians will remove portions of the connector and redesign the interface by soldering the pins to sockets at the external-to-feed-through side of the connector prior to installing the replacement into the external tank.

It is unknown how long it will take to complete the modifications and reapply foam to the shuttle’s external tank. Managers will assess the progress of the work before determining a new target launch date for Atlantis.

The emphasis is mine. The repair is quite time consuming. I have currently no details, but it looks like there will be no full root cause analysis. That would probably have required a rollback to the VAB and a destack, and that process would make an early February launch date impossible. I hope to get more details soon and will post them when I have.

STS-122 Launch Date Decision Today?

Today is the mission management team meeting for space shuttle Atlantis STS-122 mission. The meeting reviews work progress, data gathered and plans drawn and will finally conclude with a recommendation for the next steps. It is assumed that the launch date is targeted.

While January, 10th is still given as an option, news have condensed that this date will most probably not see a launch. It looks like a launch late in January or mid-February is more realistic. In any case, we’ll know much more when the meeting has concluded later today. A press briefing is expected shortly after the meeting. As far as I know, it was set for 10:30am ET, which means the meeting must have started right now.

Let’s see how the day evolves…

Atlantis STS-122 launch date not decided yet…

As I had written, the launch date for space shuttle Atlantis’ STS-122 mission has been moved to no earlier than January 2007. The tanking test last week seems to have brought quite solid data, but NASA has not yet decided which options to take.

There is still a chance that Atlantis can launch early January – but it looks a bit more like a further delay. I have read both about January, 25th and February, 14th as possible launch dates. In any case, if the shuttle can not be launched on the 10th, the rest of the shuttle flight schedule will be affected. If Atlantis mid-January or later, there is not enough time left to launch shuttle Endeavour’s SS-123 mission on February, 14th as originally planned.

NASA’s mission management team will meet again next week, on the 27th and see which additional data has been gathered. More importantly, repair options will have been thought out in the mean time and so it is expected that after that meeting the exact course of actions will be known.

There is already some work going on at the pad, but my understanding is that this is go forward work: it does some things that may be useful, based on what may be decided on the 27th. Not
doing that work right now, would limit options available.

If the January, 10th launch target can not be preserved, it is most likely that Atlantis will take up Endeavour’s launch window and the other missions move forward in an equivalent way. However, a new launch schedule will than probably be needed.

This also puts some pressure on the Constellation program – they need to wait for Atlantis’ STS-125 flight, the Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission. Only after that has been completed, launch pad 39B can be handed over to Constellation and be reconstructed. So delays in STS-122 will probably also affect constellation.

According to NASA, there is still sufficient buffer available to complete the international space station ISS before the shuttle fleet is set to retire in 2010. But that buffer is also eaten up, so this is probably another concern.

As you can see, there is a lot depending on STS-122. But I applaud NASA “better safe than sorry” approach. It is important that the space shuttle is safe to fly. And it is also important to understand that ECO sensor problem, so that the root cause will not bite again on future missions.

Tuesday: ISS Spacewalk and Shuttle Fueling Test…

Tomorrow is a busy day for NASA – both on earth as well as in orbit. Seems to be “troubleshooting Tuesday”: The international space station crew performs a spacewalk to check out what is wrong with the orbiting laboratory while the ground crew at Kennedy Space Center checks out their supply vessel. Both activities are in support of the international space station program. Let’s hope everything turns out well.

But now let me quote a mail that I received from NASA, it is an excellent wrap-up of tomorrow’s activities, including ways to experience them first hand:

NASA Television will provide simultaneous live coverage of a spacewalk by the International Space Station crew and a shuttle fueling test at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center, Fla., on Tuesday, Dec. 18.

Expedition 16 Station Commander Peggy Whitson and Flight Engineer Dan Tani are set to venture outside the station at about 6 a.m. EST to perform a detailed inspection of a giant rotary joint where contamination was found last month. The joint is used to rotate the starboard solar arrays of the complex to face the sun. The astronauts also will devote part of the spacewalk to an inspection of a device that tilts the starboard arrays toward the sun. The device, known as a Beta Gimbal Assembly, experienced unrelated electrical problems last weekend.

NASA TV’s public channel will begin coverage of spacewalk activities at 4:30 a.m. A briefing will follow the spacewalk, originating from NASA’s Johnson Space Center, Houston, no earlier than 1:30 p.m.
Reporters will be able to ask questions from participating NASA sites. The briefing participants are:

— Mike Suffredini, International Space Station Program manager
— Ginger Kerrick, International Space Station spacewalk flight director
— Tomas Gonzalez-Torres, International Space Station spacewalk officer

At 7 a.m. EST, Tuesday, NASA TV’s media channel will begin coverage of a fueling test of space shuttle Atlantis at Kennedy’s Launch Pad 39A. The fueling test will assist engineering efforts to resolve a problem with an engine cutoff sensor system that prevented Atlantis’ launch attempts earlier this month. Reporters will be notified of any plans to hold a news briefing following the test’s conclusion.

For NASA TV streaming video, schedules, and downlink information,visit:

http://www.nasa.gov/ntv

For more information about the space station and the Expedition 16 crew, visit:

http://www.nasa.gov/station

For more information about space shuttle Atlantis’ upcoming STS-122 mission, visit:

http://www.nasa.gov/shuttle

STS-122: Atlantis being instrumented…

Space shuttle Atlantis stands on Launch Pad 39A at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Photo credit: NASA/Cheryl MansfieldTroubleshooting efforts at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) continues: Space shuttle Atlantis has been instrumented for a tanking test scheduled to begin Monday. In parallel to the work at KSC, engineers at other NASA centers gather data about how the elements of the ECO sensor system should respond during the tanking test. This provides a baseline against which the actual tanking test results can be compared. Unfortunately, it is not sure if the failure will re-occur during the tanking test. But according to the latest findings it is quite likely.

Please also let me quote the relevant part of NASA’s shuttle home page:

Engineers and technicians at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center continue preparations to evaluate the hydrogen fuel sensor system on space shuttle Atlantis’ external fuel tank during a procedure next week. Working at Launch Pad 39A where Atlantis remains pointed to space, workers attached wiring to the cables that lead from the aft compartment of Atlantis to the external tank’s engine cutoff sensor system. Engineers will use the special instruments next Tuesday to send electrical pulses into the wiring and look for indications that will show the location of the issue that caused the sensors to return false readings last week. The failed readings showed up during launch countdowns on Dec. 6 and Dec. 9. Launch controllers postponed the liftoff on both occasions to find out the problem and develop solutions. Evaluations of the instruments themselves are also under way to show technicians what a normal reading on the external tank looks like. Those readings will be compared to the results from the test Tuesday during which the tank attached to Atlantis will be filled with super-cold liquid hydrogen. NASA is targeting Jan. 10 as the next possible launch opportunity for Atlantis on mission STS-122. Atlantis will carry the European-built Columbus laboratory to the International Space Station.

Shuttle Manager Hale’s Teleconference Statements

These are the notes I have taken during the December, 11th teleconference. I am posting them as I have taken them. They are largely unedited, but IMHO speak for themselves. Direct quotes are within quotation marks, the rest are my observations”. I penned this down during the teleconference, so I am pretty sure it is the exact wording.

“We set up 2 investigation teams. One is a near term team working on the current vehicle, second is a longer term team with experts from all around the agency.”

“do instrumented tanking test next Tuesday. Some instrumentation that we can put on some appropriate places at the circuits … We can capture the location in circuit in TDR, a commercially available technology … we have a high degree of confidence in pinpointing the location and once we know the location we can put together a fix.”

“STS-122 launch could definitely be a bit later than January, 2nd”

“I’ve been committed to fixing it. An intermittent electrical problem is really hard to fix. We thought we had fixed it, but we didn’t. So I might say we are RE-committed to fixing it”

Reporter: How concerned are you about the whole eco sensor system (touching on the email where Mr. Hale considered retiring this system as unreliable).

“This low level cutoff capability is a safety system that has never been used in flight… like a seat belt. If you don’t have anything bad, you probably don’t need it. If you needed it and it didn’t work it could be really bad. We would like to have this system functional and we would like to restore functionality of this system”

“There are other test, bench test of the equipment at manufactures in parallel to tanking test. Tanking test is a hazardous operation.”

Reporter: if STS-122 does not launch on January, 2nd, when then? “I let you know when we have our tanking test done and we have some data”

“The problem only occurs when we have cryo conditions present” It all works well at normal temperaturs. We are gonna to find out where the problem is.”

If the LCC criteria (number of working ECO sensors) would be changed: “Our point is to try to fix the problem and then go back to the previously LCC, rather than speculate let us wait and try to fix this problem.”

“TDR is not flight equipment, its not qualified. Its a ground system only.”

Once again on the email about retiring the eco sensors: “Our thinking has evolved from Friday when I wrote that little note.”

“We hope it repeats one more time on our test next week when we have the instrumentation”.

“Until we come to the bottom of this mystery, we are in no better shape launching any other orbiter” when asked about swapping assembly flights or orbiters to get off the ground.

“a single circuit is around a hundered feet of wire from the PSB to the sensing element.”

Test details:
“We have to physically cut the wires, we are talking about the ECO and the 5% sensor, which is in the same pass-trough and connector. We have to have people present to run that equipment. We send the red crew out during the stable replenishment phase. And if the problem is as in the past, it will stay with us during the stable replenish phase. We can not have people during tanking for safety concerns”

On a Christmas break: “We are thinking about taking a few days off to allow our folks to have a few days with their families. We’ll make that decision shortly after the tanking test.”

“The splicing of wires in the aft compartment is a standard procedure. We have identified a place where we can access the circuits that are readily accessible.”

“And then restore the circuits together when we are done with the tanking test.”

“Take the sensor’s wire harness and the LH2 pass trough connector and put them in a facility with cryo fluids and monitor how these tings respond in a lab setting. either liquid helium, warmer, or liquid hydrogen (lh2). we look at all these piece parts work. we did piece part testing before, we are doing integrated circuit from the lh2 pass through to the sensors themselves.”

“The liquid helium low level cutoff ability (LLCO) was present from the beginning , I am pretty sure it was sts-1 (99% positive). It is not a new system that has changed dramatically in design or manufacturing. The FPR is not significantly different the past 10/15 years than it is today. Just enough reserves to protect it from normal engine and operating procedures. The voltage indication system has been on sts 118 and 120 only, which were flawless.”

“The primary goal is to trouble shoot the system as it is and restore its functionality. We would only consider other measures if we fail with this.

Next tuesday full tanking test? “We need to fill the tank fully because as I said, it is our safety requirement to have people on the pad we need to be in stable replenish. It is reviewed which aux systems need to be operating. The launch team is finalizing the procedures.”

“I can not put my finger at anything that is especially difficult, its just normal operations in an unusual environment.”

ISS Stage EVA next week, Thursday afternoon, 2ET, possibly next Tuesday, SARJ

Space Shuttle ECO Sonsors: an in-depth View

Space Shuttle ECO Sensor during Testing.After the scrub of space shuttle Atlantis December 2007 launch window, everyone is interested in the ECO sensors. That shuttle component is responsible for the scrub. Unfortunately, detailed information about it is hard to find.

However, I was able to obtain some good information. Most helpful was NASA’s “STS-114 Engine Cut-off Sensor Anomaly Technical Consultation Report“. I also used other NASA sources for my writeup, including information conveyed at the post-scrub press conferences.

Let’s start with some interesting fact that space shuttle program manager Wayne Hale provided in a press conference. According to him, the ECO sensors are an Apollo heritage. Their design dates back to the 1960s. Consequently, they are analog “computer systems”, which look quite strange compared to today’s technology.

I could not find any indication of sensor malfunction prior to STS-114, the “return to flight” mission. However, I have been told that pre-STS-114 flights did not have the same rigor checks in the flight procedure as they exist today. So it may very well be that there always were problems with the sensors, but these were “just” never detected.

It should also be noted that there was never a space shuttle main engine cutoff due to an ECO sensor (I need to correct this a bit later – but let’s keep it this way for the time being). It is believed, however, that on some flights the cutoff happened just a second or so before the ECO sensors would have triggered one. The amount of fuel left in the tank can not be analyzed post-flight, as the external tank is the only non-reusable component of the shuttle stack and lost after being separated from the orbiter.

But now let’s dig down into some hard technical facts
: A good starting point are the graphics that NASA posted on the space shuttle home page. I’ll reproduce them here, but due to the blog theme, they are a bit small. Click on each image for a high-res version. It will open up in a new window, so that you can read along.

There is a drawing that puts together all the pieces. It is an excellent starting point:

Space Shuttle ECO Sensors: OverviewA brief word of caution, though: the picture titles “LH2 ECO Sensor Locations” for a good reason. It is about the liquid hydrogen (LH2) tank sensors. There are also others, as we will see below. Let’s for the time being stick with the LH2 one. As far as I know, the LH2 sensors were also the only trouble source in recent shuttle launch attempts.

This is also where I need to correct myself. There actually have been main engine cutoffs due to ECO sensors, but none of them happened due to the liquid hydrogen sensors. As far as I know, there were three missions where it happened and among them were STS-51F and STS-93.

The image shows that the ECO sensors are located right at the bottom of the tank – which makes an awful lot of sense, as they should indicate depletion. There are four of them mounted in a single row on the shock mount. Each of them has their housing containing the actual sensing element. Even though this is not show on the above overview, let me add that there is are a lot of additional components that make up the so-called “ECO sensor”. That can be nicely seen in this schematic:

Space Shuttle ECO Sensors: Overall Schematic
The actual sensing element of the space shuttle's ECO sensor system.First of all, you’ll probably notice that it is more appropriate to speak of a “sensor system” than just of a “sensor”. If we talk about sensors, most of us simply think about the actual sensing element, seen to the right here. Obviously, that takes us far too short. You must think about the whole system to understand the problem. So think sensor element, electronics and electrical connections. All of this makes up what we call the “ECO Sensor”. In my personal opinion, there is a lot of misleading information and discussions on the public Internet these days. Part of this misunderstanding IMHO seems to stem back to the “sensor” vs. “sensor system” issue. Many folks express that they don’t understand why “such a simple sensor issue” can not be fixed. I guess that was even the motivation to write this post, but, hey, I am becoming off.-topic. On with the technical facts.

Next, you’ll notice that the ECO sensors are just few of the many sensors that make up the tank level information (the “point sensors”). All of these sensors are the same. The ECOs are in no way special, except for their name. ECO stems from “Engine Cut Off” and is attributed to the fact that these sensors are a emergency line of defense to shut down the engines if other things have already gone wrong (if all goes right, the ECOs are never used, but it is the ECOs that ultimately determine the fact that something went wrong…).

If you count, you’ll find twelve sensors: the four ECO sensors, one 5%, two 98%, one 100% minus, two 100%, one 100% plus and one overfill point sensor. Note that there are sensors both in the liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid oxygen (LOX) tank. Each of them has twelve, so there is a total of 24.

A notable difference is the location of the ECO sensors: for LH2, they are at the bottom of the external thank, while for LOX they are in the feedline inside the orbiter. In plain words that means that the LOX ECO sensors report very late while the LH2 sensors report early in the process of tank draining. This can be attributed to the fact that a fuel(LH2)-rich engine shutdown is required. I also assume that the risk of fuel pump overspeed and explosion is by far higher for the LH2 part of the system (but that just my guess, found no hard fact backing it).

The number of sensors at each position tell you something about their importance: it for sure is no accident that most positions are covered by one sensor, the 98% and 100% locations have two and the depletion location has four! Obviously, depletion is a major concern.

Which brings us to the point: why four? Let’s spell it out if it is not clear yet: it’s “just” for redundancy and backup. If there would be just one sensor, a single-sensor failure could be fatal. If it failed dry, it would cause an unnecessary (and comparatively risky) launch abort, if it failed wet and something else goes wrong, it could lead to vehicle destruction. Either way is not really desired, though obviously one case is better than the other.

To mitigate that risk, there are four sensors. But how put these to use? A simplistic approach could be that a poll is taken and the majority wins. So if we have one sensor telling dry and three telling wet, we would go to wet. Obviously, there would be a problem with a 2 dry/2 wet state. So our simplistic model is too simplistic. But I hope it conveyed the idea. What the system really does is a bit different:

First of all, there is a construct called “arming mass”. Keep in mind that the ECO sensors themselves are “just” a backup system to handle the case when other things have gone wrong before. Space shuttle computers continuously monitor engine performance and calculate fuel used. So there is a rough idea of how much fuel is left in the tank at any given moment. However, these calculations may not be 100% perfect and may not detect some malfunction, thus it is risky to rely on them alone. To mitigate that risk, the ECO sensor system has been put in place.

Now let’s take an extreme example. Let’s say an ECO sensor switches to dry just one second after launch. Would you trust it and assume the tank is already drained? I hope not. There are some points in flight where both logic and physics tell us the the tank can not be depleted. In fact, during most of the ascent it can not. But when we come close to main engine cutoff, then fuel may actually be used up. Only at that stage it is useful to look at the ECO sensors. This is what “arming mass” is all about. The shuttle’s computers continuously compute estimated fuel left and only when the estimate comes within the last 8 to 12 seconds of fuel depletion, the ECO sensors are armed.

This has some bonus, too. If an ECO sensor indicates “dry” before we reach arming mass, we can assume the sensor has failed. So that sensor will no longer be able to cast its vote when it later comes to aborting the launch. Please note, however, that it is not possible to detect a “failed wet” sensor in the same way. Sensors are expected to be “wet” during ascent and doing so obviously does not disqualify a sensor.

The ECO sensor mountpoint inside the space shuttle's external tank. As can be seen, they are mounted close to each other.Once the arming mass has reached, shuttle computers look at those sensors with a healthy status. If a single sensor indicates “dry”, computers initially assume a sensor failure. Remember: all sensors are mounted at the same location (see picture to the right), so they theoretically should indicated “dry” all at the same instant. However, that sensor is not disqualified. When now any second of the healthy sensor joins the other one in reading “dry”, shuttle computers assume an actual tank depletion.

They do not wait for the remaining qualified sensors, in a case now assuming these have failed “wet”. So whenever two qualified ECO sensors indicate “dry” after the space shuttle has reached “arming mass”, an abort will most probably be initiated. That means the space shuttle main engines will be cut off in a controlled and non-destructive way (which means a fuel-rich shutdown). Depending on when and how exactly this happens, it may lead to either an abort to the transatlantic landing (TAL) sites or an abort to orbit (ATO). I guess it may even be possible to reach the desired orbit with the help of the orbital maneuvering system if the engine cutoff happens very soon before its originally scheduled time.

Please let me add that the actual procedure for tank depletion must be even more complicated than briefly outlined here. For example, what happens if three of the ECO sensors disqualify themselves by indicating “dry” early in the ascent? Will the remaining single sensor than decide about launch abort? Also, what happens if all four fail early? I don’t like to speculate here, if somebody has the answer, please provide it ;) In any case, you hopefully have gotten some understanding now that the ECO sensor system and putting it to use is not as simple as these days it is often written on the web…

Now let’s look a little bit about where the sensors are located. If you paid attention to the above drawing, you have noticed the black lines which separate parts in the tank from parts in the orbiter (and yet from those at mission control center on the ground).

The best picture of the actual ECO sensor housing I could find is this one:

Space Shuttle ECO Sensors during a test procedurePlease note that it shows the ECO sensors during a test, in a test configuration. The mount is different from the actual one in the external tank.

The computers driving the sensors are located in the orbiter’s avionics bay:

Space Shuttle ECO Sensors: Orbiter Avionics BaysThis, and the following, drawings mention the “point sensor box”, PSB for short. Remember that the sensors together are the “point sensors” and the ECO sensors are just point sensors with a special name and function. NASA also lets us know where exactly the point sensor box is located in the shuttle’s aft:

Space Shuttle ECO Sensors: Orbiter Aft Avionics BaysAnd finally, we have some more information on the point sensor box itself:

Space Shuttle ECO Sensors: Functional Block Diagram of Point Sensor BoxThe point sensor box interprets sensor readings. The sensor elements provide a voltage. Certain low voltage level means “dry” while certain high voltage levels are interpreted as “wet”. However, somewhat above the “wet” levels, they indicated “dry” again. This level is reached when there is an open circuit.

NASA also provided an the exploded view of the point sensor box:

Space Shuttle ECO Sensors: Exploded View of Point Sensor Box
To me, it just looks like a box for electronics and I do not get any further insight from looking at the drawing. But anyways – it’s nice to know…

I could not find pictures of the not-yet-mentioned sensor system parts: the connectors and cables. Somehow the in-tank sensors and the on-board point sensor box must be connected to each other. This is done via some cables and connectors. Those must also be looked at when thinking about the system as whole. Especially as the failure reading we see points to an open circuit. I have read that some of the cable are below external tank foam. So its not easy to get to them.

I have heard that cryogenic temperatures are probably part of the trouble. Because failure readings seem to happen only when the tank ins filled (and thus very cold). One could assume that shrinking of ultra-cold material is part of the problem, but again, I have not found any credible references for this – or any other thermal results.

So it is now probably time to going right to the source. Below, find reproduced the deep technical description from the STS-114 paper quoted right at the start of this posting (quoted text in italics):

The MPS ECO system consists of point-sensors installed in the ET liquid hydrogen (LH2) tank and the Orbiter’s liquid oxygen (LO2) feedline. Point sensor electronics are designed to condition signals and to provide appropriate stimulation of the sensors and associated wiring and connectors.

Space Shuttle ECO Sensors: Overall Schematic

The point sensor electronics interprets a low resistance at a sensor as the presence of cryogenic liquid, which provides a “wet” indication to the Multiplexer/De-Multiplexer (MDM) for use by on-board General Purpose Computers (GPCs) and the ground Launch Processing System (LPS). Conversely, a high resistance is interpreted as a “dry” indication. The point sensor electronics include circuitry suitable for pre-flight verification of circuit function and are designed to fail “wet”. For example, an open circuit in the sensor, or an open or short in the signal path, will provide a “wet” indication to the MDM. The system is then activated and checked out during launch countdown and remains active during ascent.

The actual sensing element of the space shuttle's ECO sensor system.An ECO sensor is depicted in the next Figure. The sensor consists of a platinum wire sensing element mounted on an alumina Printed Wiring Board (PWB) and is encased in an aluminum housing. The sensing element acts as a variable resistance which changes on exposure to cryogenic liquid. This resistance variation is detected by post-sensor (signal conditioning) electronics and is used to generate either a “wet” or “dry” indication as noted above.

Space Shuttle ECO Sensors: System Overview

The ECO system is designed to protect the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) from catastrophic failure due to propellant depletion. Flight software is coded to check for the presence of “wet” indications from the sensors within 8 to 12 seconds of SSME shutdown. The software rejects the first “dry” indication observed from any of the ECO sensors, but the presence of at least two more “dry” indications will result in a command to shutdown the SSMEs (i.e., “dry” indications from two of four “good” sensors are required for SSME shutdown). Early SSME shutdown would probably lead to a contingency Trans-Atlantic (TAL) abort. A failed “wet” indication cannot be detected. The system is designed so that LO2 depletion should occur first. However, a failure “wet” indication of three of the four LH2 sensors, coupled with an SSME problem that results in early LH2 depletion, could result in catastrophic failure of a SSME. Failure probability is considered remote, but would almost certainly be catastrophic to the flight vehicle. The system architecture addresses redundancy with one point sensor box containing four groups of sensor conditioner circuit cards. Each card can accommodate one hydrogen and one oxygen sensor. Each card group has its own power converter and one sensor conditioner card from each group services a pair of ECO sensors (again, one hydrogen and one oxygen). Wiring for each of the eight ECO sensors is split into one of two groups of sensors which are routed through separate Orbiter / ET monoball connections.

Let’s wrap-up: I hope you got a more in-depth view of the ECO sensor system by reading this post. At least, I think I have so by doing the research and writing it. Remember that I am no expert in this area, so I may be wrong. If you spot something that needs to be corrected, just drop me a note, for example in the form of a comment.

In regard to recent (STS-122…) developments, the question now is: what should be done if the root cause of the ECO sensor system failure can not be found. I don’t know, I miss too many facts. and my understanding is limited. But my guess is that if there can be rationale found to fly without it, that’s probably the best option to carry out. But hopefully tanking tests will show where it is flawed and a solution can be applied. Either way, I trust those wizards at NASA (and its contractors, of course). They have the have the training, they have the insight and they have the excellence. What else could one ask for?

To Launch or not to Launch?

The missing management team at NASA will have a very tough day today. As far as I know, a series of meetings have already begun. They are all about the ECO sensor issue – and how to proceed. It is hard to predict the outcome.

Let’s try to put some pieces together. Keep in mind that all of this is my personal guesswork. So tomorrow you may judge me based on what actually happens (hey, will I really do that…?).

From a technical point of view, it looks like the sensor issue can not be fixed quickly enough. The fact that there are intermittent problems in at least three (all four?) sensors makes it look like a problem with the electronics or cabling – not the sensors themselves. Fixing that would require at least three days at the pad – if it can be done there at all. Some think that a rollback is necessary. Troubleshooting the sensor system would best be done by a tanking test. However, that test has been called off by NASA in favor of consumables replenishment. To me, this is an indication that NASA has given up on fixing the ECO sensor system. In the press conference, they also mentioned that they are looking into rationale to fly as is. That also supports my argument.

But stop. Don’t say “better save than sorry”. Of course crew safety is first. But then remember that the ECO sensors are part of a backup system that kicks in when some other things already went wrong. They prevent the space shuttle main engines from running dry. So what? Do you think NASA puts not enough fuel into the tank? Obviously that isn’t the case. There is more than enough fuel in the tank for launch. So for the tank to run dry, something must be working quite wrong in the first place. Something like a leak or a similar serious issue. That’s an important point: the ECO sensors are an additional line of defense, but one that is never used in a normal flight. But, then, of course there is a reason for them to being there.

No let’s look at program constraints. If STS-22 can not make this launch window, it is not catastrophic, but will cause a wiggle in the schedule. Quite one, I think. That would cause already-much delayed international space station construction to be delayed even further. It will possibly also affect Constellation and Ares if the STS-125 hubble service mission must be moved. Pad 39B can only be handed over to Ares after the mission, because the STS-125 rescue launch-on-need mission needs to be at a pad to be able to launch it soon enough in case it is needed. So both pads are needed whenever STS-125 launches.

I guess there are also ISS constraints. We already know that construction is much delayed. Guess what? Space hardware has an expiry date. For example, the Columbus module that shall now be delivered by Atlantis is made to endure ten years in orbit. Of course, everyone hopes it will last longer. But its a simple fact: the longer hardware is in space, the less lifespan remains. Now think about all those years that other ISS components are already up there in space – waiting for the construction to finally complete. And every space ship is only as strong as its weakest part. May it be that any delay shrinks the time the ISS as whole can be productive in space (right now, its not really productive – much maintenance and construction going on and few science). Of course, a one month launch slip won’t hurt. But any larger delay will.

There is probably also one other risk with delaying the flight: if the ISS crew has to carry out vital tasks during STS-122 docked operations, their skills will fade. Astronauts are extremely well trained. But it is for a good reason that the practice until the last moment. Practicing at the ISS is rather limited. So the longer it takes, the less well-prepared the crew is. Of course, I do not know that really is an issue at this time. With STS-120, it was a very vital concern, because of all the complex staging spacewalks required by the ISS crew.

Think about it: it is not “just” the shuttle crew that must be kept save. There are also others (I have to admit that I too often overlooked that part of the picture).

As I said, its a tough decision…

Even if they launch as is, I do not think that the space shuttle’s crew life is more at risk than at any other launch (remember: spaceflight *is* a risky business). However, if something goes wrong and NASA needs to rely on the sensors, they will probably use ultra-conservative procedures. At least this is what I would expect. Thus, a launch abort would be much more likely.

And now think what happens if there is TAL (Transatlantic Abort Landing). First of all, it would be expensive. But even worse, how would the public react? Wouldn’t that be the last nail in NASA’s space shuttle program (and probably Constellation as well)? So there is a high risk in that, too. At least from an overall program perspective.

There are also political implications. Especially in this mission. Atlantis carries the European Columbus module into space. That cost roughly a billion (!) dollars. I guess the ESA would not be very amused if Columbus would be damaged due to some launch failure. Please note that I do not talk of a catastrophic failure, but of an abort, which can cause harm anyway. Given the fragile relationship between NASA and ESA, there is obviously some political thought that must be involved in the decision making.

I hope you by now have gotten an idea how many things and details need to be considered. I am sure I am still just scratching on the surface. The bottom line is that none of us outsiders will be in the position to judge it correctly. We should remind ourselves about that when we talk about the final mission management team decision.

Also, we do not have any solid data. The most important thing missing is probabilities. How probable is it that the ECO sensors are actually needed – I mean that the tank really runs dry? Is it 1 in 5,000? Or 1 in 100? The former one is probably a risk that can be accepted (the debris hit probability is much higher) while the later one obviously draws a different picture. Without solid data, you can not decide.

The whole situation looks much like the RCC panel issue we had with STS-120. However, at that time there was some more solid data at the time of decision making.

This is what the meetings are currently about: gathering data, looking at options and then deciding on what is the best thing to do after everything is put together. Such a decision, whatever it may be, easily upsets some folks (us, maybe?) who do not have the full reasoning at hand. I personally trust NASA guys to do the right thing. These are very bright people, doing a tremendous job in a very unforgiving business.

But would is my personal bet? I promised to do one… Tough, really tough. If I had to decide with just the information that is in this post… Well, I would probably fly as is on Saturday. Am I having launch fewer? Judge yourself. Here is my line of defense:

  1. The ECO sensors are “just” a second line of defense. Something else must go seriously wrong in order to need them.
  2. During launch, crew and mission control can manually monitor ECO sensor performance. If the show dry early into flight, this must be a failure. I admit that it gets harder the later we go into flight.
  3. If an abort is needed, there are established procedures and no catastrophic outcome is to be expected. However, the shuttle program and NASA itself would probably pay a big price. That risk is accepted.
  4. The launch and construction schedule can be maintained.
  5. The risk for the ISS crew is minimized

If I look at my arguments, number one and two are the strongest one. If looking from a political point of view, you may also come to the decision to postpone to avoid the program risk. And, of course, depending on probabilities, you would like to avoid a lunch because of crew safety risks. But now I am spinning in circles ;)

I’ve done my bet, now let’s see what the real outcome is.

Shuttle Launch on Friday?

A number of folks have asked me if space shuttle Atlantis will launch on Friday. While there is a chance for a December, 7th shuttle launch, nothing solid is yet known. We need to wait until the 4pm ET press conference. In the mean time, please be sure to read my posting about the latest official NASA briefing. And, of course it is better to scrub a shuttle launch attempt than to risk crew and vehicle in a situation where launch parameters are not within set limits.

2008 Space Shuttle Launches

I thought I post some potential launch dates for 2008. Only the February date for STS-123 is officially given by NASA, the others are based on well-informed rumor. However, NASA has decided to continue to use space shuttle Atlantis after the Hubble service mission in August 2008. That will most probably affect the overall launch scheduled. I would be very careful planning anything based on the dates given below, as they are likely to change.

February , 2008: STS-122, flown by space shuttle Atlantis.

March, 11th, 2008: STS-123, flown by space shuttle Endeavour

May, 31st, 2008
: STS-124, flown by space shuttle Discovery

August, 28th 2008
: STS-125, flown by space shuttle Atlantis. This is the famous Hubble space telescope servicing mission. Please note that for this launch it will be the last time in history that you can see two space shuttles being at the launch pads at the same time. Atlantis will be at pad 39A and Endeavour will be at pad 39B, ready to launch for a (hopefully never needed) rescue mission. Pad 39B will be handed over to the Ares/Constellation (NASA’s new moon program) after this launch.

October, 16th 2008: STS-126, flown by space shuttle Endeavour

December, 4th 2007: STS-119, flown by space shuttle Discovery

All missions except STS-125 are ISS construction flights and will be launched from pad 39A.