Strong passwords? Forbidden!

American Express, as a bank and card issuer should be a fairly security sensitive company. Right? Well, it looks like they have not yet learned their lesson. Occasionally, I log in to my AmEx account to gain access to memebership rewards (these nice gimmicks that shall trick you into charging to AmEx as much as possible). I tend to have my credentials not at hand when doing so, but thankfully AmEx has a quite secure system to recover your credentials.

What really bugs me is their password requirement. A password can have a maximum of 8 characters and consist only of letters and numbers! Ouch… what about strong passwords? They are simply forbidden by AmEx. The funny thing is that the web site doesn’t even complain when you enter a too-strong (aka longer or alphanumeric) password. It simply ignores the extra characters. Some time last year this drove me crazy as I could not log in after changing my password. Guess what, I used a too strong one and of course it didn’t match to what the system generated. I called customer service and also complained about being forced to use insecure passwords. That was several month ago.

New year, new try – old problem… Nothing learned, still 8 chars max and only letters and number. Frankly, AmEx, who is advising you on security? I really wonder if under US law AmEx is responsible if someone breaks into my account. I think they should…

new syslog RFC will not advance…

I thought that after 5 years of IETF syslog WG work, I’d already be through all potential sources of frustration. Wrong! Last Friday, I was notified that the otherwise ready-to-be-published RFC could not be published because the IETF requires a copyright assignment to the trust, in which the author must grant all rights. Of course, he must also do so on behalf of every contributor.

Quite frankly speaking, this is more or less impossible for this draft. Among the many reasons is that it would be extremely time-consuming to verify each and every (small) contribution from the past 5 years. Also, I copied (perfectly legal than) text from other RFCs, who do not know who contributed. There are more reasons, but I do not like to elaborate on all of them again.

The bottom line is that the syslog RFC series is again stalled. The IETF has at least identified there is a problem and a work-around is being discussed. A decision will be made on February, 15th. Let’s hope for the best, otherwise all the work would probably be lost.

This IMHO is also a good example on what a too-far streched system of intellectual property rights can do. This, and also software patents, are a threat to our freedom. The stop progress and unnecessarily limit out capabilities. Hopefully more and more people realize that and will tell their governments to stop this abusive system.

Thailand is going syslog…

I found an interesting read in “The Nation”, one of Thailand’s largest business dailies. They talk about the economic crisis and the way Thailand plans to reduce negative effects. There is a 5-point initiative in place. Of interest for us the the fifth and final point:

Finally, the association will focus on security, which promises to be this year’s main technology trend. It will urge software companies to become more familiar with Syslog, which is a standard for forwarding log messages in an IP network, but is also typically used for computer system management and security auditing.

So, as it looks, Thailand is betting on security. This is obviously a good movement. Interestingly, they seem to have identified logging, and syslog in specific, to be a major building block in this endeavor. That’s a bit surprising, given the typical weaknesses of syslog. But they’ve probably identified the broad potential this protocol has. Maybe I should look a bit more towards Asia with rsyslog and phpLogCon as well as the Windows product line.

Joined the Security Bloggers Network

Yesterday I joined the Security Blogger’s Network. I discovered this interesting network by accident and thought it may be worth contributing to it. While I am writing mostly about logging and log analysis, this definitely has a lot to do with security. So I asked Alan, the person in charge, if he’d consider adding my blog – man, was he quick. I got a positive response soon after my request and have also already been added to the site. Great. So welcome all new readers.

The good thing is that this motivates me to write a bit more about the security aspects, which I think is a good thing to existing readers, too.

Drop me a comment if you have any opinion on me appearing in the network – especially if you have an idea of what you would like to read about logging.

SyslogAppliance Keyboard

This morning, Google alerts brought up a nice blog post on how to reconfigure SyslogAppliance‘s keyboard settings.

I think some users already asked about keyboard reconfiguration. However, the blog post suggest that it is much more painful to do than I thought (I agree with the author that “dpkg-reconfigure console-setup” should have done the job). I’ll see that I finally include this functionality in the automated setup. It should not be too hard. After all, I have a “run once” script already in place.

Back from the break ;)

Hi folks,

I am right now back from my extended xmas break. Well, actually I’ve been gone right after xmas and been away – even mostly without email – for two weeks.

I was delighted to see that the rsyslog community was quite active during this time (which usually has low activity at all due to the holidays). An the sad side, that also means I have a couple of bug reports outstanding. One I managed to fix today, the others will need a little more time. Obviously, there are quite a lot of things going on, and these need to be taken care of, too. I need to do a few changes to our internal infrastructure, and then I’ll look into rsyslog, phpLogCon and the appliances.

One of the major undertakings I hope to finish in the not so distant future is fixing a stability bug that seems to occur on 4+ core machines only. I got another but report over the holidays and hope that I get enough momentum to finally track it down – we’ll see…

That’s it for now, I just wanted to keep you updated.

Oh – and did I mention happy new year ;) [it’s not too late right now…]

Rainer

root cause of security issue in rsyslog

If you have followed the rsyslog mailing list, you have noticed that we had a small, but still noteworthy, security issue in rsyslog recently. In short words, the $AllowedSender directive was accepted but no longer honored, given potentially any remote system a chance to send messages to the instance in question (its a minor issue because most people rightfully tend to use firewalls to carry out that kind of access control).

After this is now settled, I sat back, relaxed and meditated a bit about the root cause of the issue. Acutally, I didn’t need to think very hard. The problem was introduced when I implemented the netstream driver class. During that implementation, I shuffled a lot of code to the now-modular interfaces. Among them were the access control lists, whose roots were kept in global variables at this time.

I screwed up the first time when I allowed them to remain global variables. We all know that global variables are evil, especially when making publically accessible. Now that we moved to a proper interface, I should have replaced them by a function call. Doing that in the first place had prevented the problem. Why? Because I just initialized the now-interface specific global variable “representative” with the value at time of interface creation, which meant NULL in all cases. So whoever used the interface, always got an empty list, which meant no access control was configured.

Any user-configuration still hit the global variable, which caused the ACLs to be created, but no part of the code ever accessed it any longer. One may argue if that is a simple coding error, and there is some truth in it, but I’d still say its primarily a design issue (bad design promises to provide the quick solution, but it seldom does…).

And as it always takes at least two faults to really screw up, the next major issue wasn’t around to far. Rsyslog had not – and still has not! – a formal test suite that you can simply run each time code changes. I have begun to employ some limited test cases via “make check”, but they cover primarily exotic aspects and do not yet contain any serious test case that involves actually running rsyslogd against any serious number of messages. One of the reasons is that I had no good tool for doing so, or that I considered building the test suite to be too expensive (in comparison what else needed to do). As a small excuse I would like to mention that some others have encouraged this view. But I always new it is a lame excuse…

So it exactly happened what usually happens in such cases: the test case vital to discover this problem was not present in the series of test I ran against the new code. As usual, the programmer himself tests whatever he thinks needs testing. And, also as usual, this means that the programmer doesn’t test those things that he can not think of being wrong. Usually, these are the real problems, because if the programmer did not think of a potential problem, he did not implement, or at least carefully check, for it. This is just another example, why external testers are needed.

In open source, users adopting the devel and beta releases are often considered to be these testers. Quite frankly, I could not afford a full testing lab and continue developing the project. I think this is true for most open source projects. “Free testing” by early adopters is a major advantage over closed source. But this time, this failed, too. Probably the (small) club of early adopters also did not think about this issue. Maybe that’s because the more knowledgeable folks prefer to solve this problem with a firewall, which is the better approach to use for various reasons (not to be outlined here, see security advisory for details).

Finally, the issue came up in the form of a bug report. Unfortunately quite later, month after the initial release. But it was reported and so I could fix it as quickly as possible once I knew.

The important lesson to learn is that it usually takes more than one error to cause real problems. But these things happen!

I think the case also strengthens the need for good, systematic testing. Some time ago, I began to look into the DejaGnu testing suite and asked the mailing list if somebody had some experience in it. Unfortunately, nobody showed up. I’ll now give it another shot. There have been too-often small problems that were rooted in things not being consistently tested. Most often, it were only really small issues, like missing files, or some variables not defined in some conditional path. Since I improved my “make distcheck” settings, many of these small items no longer appear. Even the small set of current exotic tests reveal a problem from time to time.

So I think it would be wise to try to expand the test cases that rsyslog runs on regular basis. Frankly, I will not be able to create a full suite from the ground up. But the idea is if I once manage to get DejaGNU – or something similar – up and running, and acquire the necessary knowledge, I could gradually add tests as I go along. So over time, the tests would increase and we could finally very much better, automatic, that existing functionality is no longer broken by new features.

I will try to get the focus for my next release steps on DejaGNU. Obviously, any help in doing so is appreciated.

security…

No system is totally secure. Few systems are totally insecure. Most systems are between these two extremes. But what does “more secure” mean? We had an interesting discussion on the rsyslog mailing list on the use of root jails. I’d like to reproduce one of my posts here, not only because it is mine, but because it can guard us a bit towards the security goals for rsyslog.

Let me think of security as a probability of security breach. S_curr is the security of the reference system without a root jail. S_total is the security of a hypothetical system that is “totally secure” (knowing well that no such system exists). In other words, the probability S_total equals 0.

I think the common ground is that a root jail does not worsen security. Note that I do not say it improves security, only that it does not reduce a system’s security. S_jail is the security of a system that is otherwise identical to the reference system, but with a root jail. Than S_jail <= s_curr, because we assume that the security of the system is not reduced.

I think it is also common ground that the probability of a security breach is reduced if the number of attack vectors is reduced, without any new attack vectors being added. [There is one generic “attack vector”, the “thought of being secure and thus becoming careless” which always increases as risk is reduced – I will not include that vector in my thoughts]

We seem to be in agreement that a root jail is able to prevent some attacks from being successful. I can’t enumerate them and it is probably useless to try to do so (because attackers invent new attacks each day), but there exist some attacks which can be prevented by a root jail. I do not try to weigh them by their importance.

For obvious reasons, there exist other attacks which are not affected by the root jail. Some of them have been mentions, like the class of in-memory based attacks, code injection and many more.

I tend to think that the set of attack vectors that can be prevented by a root jail is much smaller than the set of those which can not. I also tend to think that the later class contains the more serious attack vectors.

But even then, a root jail seems to remove a subset of the attack vectors that otherwise exist and so it reduces the probably of security breach. So it benefits security. We can only argue that it does not benefit security if we can show that in all cases we can think of (and those we can not), security is not improved. However, some cases have been show, where it improves, so it can not be that security is not improved in all cases. As such, a root jail improves security, or more precisely the probability of a security breach is

0 < S_jail < S_curr

We can identify the benefit we gain is the difference between the reference system’s probability of security breach and the system with the jail. Be S_impr this improvement, than

S_impr = S_curr – S_jail

Now the root jail is just one potential security measure. We could now try to calculate S_impr for all kinds of security measures, for example a privilege drop. I find it hard to do the actual probability calculations, but I would guess that S_impr_privdop > S_impr_jail.

Based on the improvements, one may finally decide what to implement first (either at the code or admin level), all of this of course weighted with the importance of the numbers.

In any case, I think I have shown that both is correct:

  • the root jail is a security improvement
  • there exist numerous other improvements, many of them probably more efficient than the jail

starting with rsyslog v4…

Finally, rsyslog v4 is materializing. Yesterday, I released the first devel version that is named 4.1.0. This starts a totally new branch. I decided to finally move on to v4 because I am enhancing performance quite a bit and this causes a number of big changes to the core engine as well as many modules. So rather than doing all of this in v3, I thought it is a good time to move to a new major version.

I expect that the new code will de-stabilize the project for some time and so I have now a feature-rich v3-stable release which will be available to everyone, at the price of less performance. That doesn’t mean v3 is slow, but v4 is even much faster. So I can finally begin to experiment a bit more with the new v4 branch and don’t need to think too hard that I may be introducing changes that are hard to roll into a stable within a reasonable time frame.

As far as the first v4-stable is concerned, I do not expect one to surface before February 2009 and, obviously, it will be not as stable as v3-stable is.

So the game is starting once again, and I hope you enjoy it ;)

Windows 2008 Event Log…

Did you know – Windows 2008 has a much changed event log format. There are new APIs and formats all over that operating system. The first incarnation of the new logging system was seen in Windows Vista, but, being a workstation OS, it did not receive much attention from the corporate world.

When Vista came out, we at Adiscon immediately introduced the new event log monitor V2 service in MonitorWare Agent and EventReporter. That service worked well, but not many customers ever used it (who really monitors the workstation event logs…).

With the rise of Windows 2008 Server, we saw a notable increase in interest. And we finally got questions! While we always supported all properties, some of the former event log monitor properties are not available under the Windows 2008 event system. A number of customers asked if we could map them. Makes an awful lot of sense, especially if you have log analysis scripts that expect those fields. So I went to development (no longer working on Windows myself these days) and asked what we could do. I thought it would be trivial. But it wasn’t. Some mappings seem to have really hard, plus we got the impression (from lack of discussion and coverage) that we are probably among the first to ever work in this area). But nothing can stop a good programmer ;)

So I was quite happy to learn today that we have finally manage to include a full emulation of pre-Windows 2008 event properties. The code currently is in beta, and is available both for MonitorWare Agent and EventReporter.

I am especially happy as the new emulation also makes it far easier for phpLogCon to work with Windows events in a consistent way. Not to mention that I like happy customers ;)